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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOHO'l'HY GRAHAM (L()pgz) l 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
l'lH~i''lj~HIH~D RISK l\LUTUAL 
T~~URANCl1~ COl\fPANY 





Plaiittiff is entitled to a trial on the merits. 'l1he 
motion dismissing plaintiff's complaint with the preju-
dice should he abated and set aside and the plaintiff 
allowed a trial on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Parties arc being referred to as the same in court 
below. 
On April 18, 1964, at approximately midnight Dor-
othy Graham collided with another automobile at 3500 
1 
South 3600 \Vest in Salt Lake Cou11ty, rta1i. Tl1Pn, w, 1 ~ 
no claim of intoxication, no tiC'kets ·were is<.:lH'r1 l1y tJi,. 
inY0stigating officer; in faet, hP was a \\itnr·ss for \Trs. 
Graham that she was not illtn:xicater1. Thr> srJlr: issue was 
which car ran the trnffic light. SnrJsr,qur·nt1:-. \YaltPr 
Sterzer sued Dorothy Graham (Lopez) fnr $1,Gi:l.J11 
property clamage; $:26:J.OO Special drimagr~: ~2~J{)(J r11; 
General damage: .Jean SterzPr. 11is wifr·. snr·c1 D<•l•it ]11 
Graham for $10,000.00 GP11Pra1 11amagC> aw1 ~ii:i.00 Sp,·-
cial damagPs. She turned hPr s11mm011s itlH1 c·litims n\·.,1 
to her insurancP company, the c1Pfonr1rrnts ]1r>n·i11. a11d 
the:· refusPd to defend. Tlwy r1P11iN1 con·rn!!1· 11po11 tl11· 
g-ronm1s that when she> applic·d for i11snrnnc·c· n11 .J1111(' ·:. 
1960, she signed an application l11n11k ill wl1i<·l1 "-n..; i'ri11t 
ed that the applicant r1id not ll'C intnxiC"flting lwHra~r"' 
and would not during the term of the pnlic:-. Tl1•· i11:-"lll'-
ance comrmny not on1:· illformc·11 Dnrntl1:- (~rnl1<1rn tliat 
."he had no coYerage lmt al.'o i11fiirmc·11 tl11' ~t1·1z1·r'. tlH·i1 
attorney Yictor Sagers arn1 the Lake "\Tntors. tl1r· otli11 
claimants in the suit. that thl'l'l-. "-as i10 cnn·rn!!t'. all ot 
which was in writing. 
rpon being told that sht• lrnt1 110 C'OYL-1'<1\!:l', ,:}i\' ('ill-
ploy-ed ~[ark S. ~liner who defrnt1CL1 the ,-uit 11rn11U"l1t ll\· 
the Stcrzer's and who also 1irong-ht this snit for ,farnag-r~ 
against the Preforred Risk Insurance Cci. for l1rrach 
of contract on the policy. Sn11sl)t}lWlltl:- aft(·r 1m'tri:il 
the Prefrrred Risk Insurance Co. setth>Ll "-irh thr ~trrz­
L'rs hut refused to settle with Dorothy Graham for ltn'-
pital bills for ht:.>rself and lwr lrnsba1lll .foe Lc111ez. Tliry 
also refusrd to pay any attorney fee5 to her attornrY 
)[ark S. )[int•r for his defense in the Sterzer easr. 
,..., 
This rase ,,·as pretried on March 9, 1966 hy the 
lfonornhle .Joseph .Jeppson, who ruled that the plaintiff 
was e1,titlc•d to a jnry trial on the issues herein, rulin~ 
tlwt the issue of any representations or warranties and/ 
•Jl' their matr,rialit~r were for the jury to decide. 
On ~ray 9, 19G6, the day set for jury trial, Counsel 
\<.;1.c: ,.,d]!·d into the chambers of .Judge Ellett who, with 
;ill of tlH• plaintiff's witnesses and the jury setting the 
, ourt room. summarily granted a motion dismissing 
pl<1i11liff's rase on the repr0s0ntation of the Insurance 
<'ompnny f'On11srl that Dorothy Graham (Lopez) had 
\\\ o drinks at npproximately 7 p.m. the day of the acc.i-
dt·nt, maintaining that intoxication was immaterial. 
l'L11ntiff's eonnscl had no notice or knowledge that any 
c:nrli moti011 wonl<l he mad0, he was not allowed to submit 
,1m e\·i1knrc, t>H'll though his witnesses were in the court 
room, 110 affidavits or counter affidavits were allowed, on 
tl11 mrrr representation of the Company's Counsel the 
plni11tiff's cause was dismissed. Absolutely no evidence 
11 ;1s before the court. Plaintiff was not allowed to in-
t rodn<'f' the policy or documents favorable to plaintiff's 
rnnsc nml although the adjuster who had written the 
(1o('ument tcad hy the Company attorney was subpoenaed 
tl1c ('Ourt refused to let him testify. THE COURT 
RULED THAT ANY DRINKING, HOWEVER MI-
XFTTA. OX THE PART OF DOROTHY GRAHAM 
\ FTER THE APPLICATION BLANK WAS SIGNED 
\'( llDED THE POLICY. 
Thi' application upon which the Court ruled was filled 
out on .June 3, 1960, hy Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance 
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Company's agent. A copy is annexed hereto and hy ref-
erence made a part hereof. The application provide8 
that it is to he filed hy their agent. No copy was gfren to 
Dorothy Graham Lopez. The representation which 
prompted the summary ruling of the Court is item :1 
under REPRESENT A TIO NS: ''I do not use alcoholie 
beverages and will not do so for the term of the po lie~-." 
On the hasis of this application the defendant com-
pany issued a policy for collision arnl compn•lw11siY<' 
co,·erage on a 1954 Ford automohile. This polic~· wns 
renewed December 3, 1960; .Tmw :), 1961; aml the11 011 
September 21, 1961, without any n0w applicatio11 or in-
quiry hy the insurance company the polie~· was trans-
ferred to 1958 Bel Air Che\Tol0t and the conrag-P was 
increased to include bodily injury and medical pa~·mt·nts. 
This latter policy was renew0d on 12-3-fil, 6-3-62, 12-:~-()2; 
then on 4-23-63 the policy was transfe1-r0<1 to a l~Hi:l 
Comet; with a subsequent r0m'wal hei11g made 011 6-:l-(i:l 
and 12-3-65, with the policy lwing in full fon·0 arnl pffr<'1 
on April 18, 1964, the date of tlw collision from whicl1 
this action a rose. 
POINTS OF LA vV 
1. The Court erred in snmmarilv dismissi11g plai11-
tiff 's case without notice, without allowi11g plaintiff to 
present any evidence or affidavits, without permitfo1g thP 
plaintiff to present any law. 
2. The Court erred in holding that the representa-
tion that policy applicant did not drink and would not 
during the term of the policy was a warranty. 
4 
The Court erred in holding that any drinking, 
however minutia, of alcoholic beverage voided policy 
from beginning; and that the issue of intoxication was 
inunatcrial. 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE 
PLAINTIFF'S CASE: (1) WITHOUT NO-
TICJiJ; (2) WITHOUT ALLOWING THE 
PLAINTIFF TO PRESENT ANY WITNESS-
F,S, gvIDENCE, OR EVEN AN AFFIDAVIT; 
on WITHOUT PERMITTIING THE PLAIN-
TIFF TO PRESENT ANY LAW. 
!\lay 9, 1966, at 10 a.m., Counsel was called into the 
cliamhcrs of Hon. A. H. Ellett; Judge Ellett said that 
tli<'fe was question of coverage that should be settled if 
the plaintiff had been drinking. An argument ensued, 
part of whieh was taken down and part of which was not 
tnken down. The reporter mistakenly put Mr. Miner on 
rrma rks made hy Mr. Kipp. To-wit: She drank several 
ronrnls between seven thirty and midnight." This was 
a r'~mark made by Mr. Kipp and Mr. Miner violently ob-
j0rtcd to same and it was Mr. Miner who said, "I don't 
think that is right and I doubt Mr. Kipp will claim other-
wise." Mr. Kipp did produc.e a statement made by an 
immnmcc adjuster which stated the Plaintiff had two 
highballs in the area of seven o'clock. Mr. Kipp argued 
that intoxication was immaterial. The Plaintiff was in 
rourt, the adjuster was under subpoena, the investigating 
offie<>r was available to testify that the plaintiff was not 
iutoxica.ted; in fact, Mr. Kipp made no claim of intoxica-
tion but claimed a breach of warranty. Stating that 
5 
when the drinking occurred the amount was immat<•rial. 
The t>ntire proceeding did not last ;) minutPs and 1110 
Court dismissed plaintiff's complaint. 
Rule 56 providL•s that a part~- is entitle<l to 10 <la>·s' 
notice lwfore the time fixed for a hearing. Plai11tiff 
had none. The rule also provides that tlw adverse part~­
may file affidavits or pro<luce evi<lPnce; this right ,,·as 
<lenied the plaintiff, even though the plailltiff had suh-
poenaed wihwss sitting in the court room. Plaintiff and 
her attorney was d<'nied th<' right to submit anv law to 
support their position; the Court arbitrarily rnk'd with-
out notice, without <'Videnee and without givi11g tlw plain-
tiff a right to be heard. This all owrrnlPd a prPvions 
ruling by the Honorable .Jospph .Jeppson who had im·-
viously held that the quPstion of l"PJH'L'Selltation a11d/or 
warranty was an issuP, alld that tlw quPstion of its ma-
t(•riality was one of fact to lw <lPcidPd hy th<' jur>-. This 
all addC'd to the complete surprisP of tlw plai11titf wl10 
came prepared to try said issm's on the faet arnl tlH' law 
as was laid down by the prC'-trial judge>. 
This Court has consistl•lltl~· lwld that a snmma r>· 
judgment should only be grantPd wlwn takillg tlw viL•w 
most favorable to party's claim and any proof that rnigl1t 
be properly adduced thereurnlPr, he could ill 110 l'Hllt 
prevail. See Kidman v. White, :H8 Pac. 2d 898, 14 rtal1 
2d 142. In the instant case on tlw mere remark of "All 
right. I will grant the motion." (This counsel knows of 
no motion being made nor its contents.) "I don't thi11k 
this is covered. I think if thC'y say they are not going to 
drink and get a red need rate, the party doesn't cover it.'' 
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'rcll the jury they are discharged ... " There was no 
"'·idPnce of a reduced rate; there was no evidence of in-
1 ox irn tion; the only evidence of drinking was remarks by 
th~ insurance company's counsel. Every right granted 
the plaintiff under Rule 56 was violated. Every rule pro-
;10unced hy this Court on summary judgments was tra-
, 1'rst><l. Plaintiff was denied every right granted by this 
.·ourt, to-wit: that of notice; right to be heard and pre-
srnt proof; the right to present the cases and law on the 
points rn 18sue. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN ARBITRARILY 
RULING THAT THE REPRESENTATION ON 
THE APPLICATION WAS A WARRANTY IN 
'rHE POLICY. 
'rhe plaintiff had the policy in court but the Court 
rrfnset1 to examine same. The policy has no such war-
nrnt~· or representation nor was it in any way included by 
: <'frrPnce. The application blank for collision and comp-
n•IH'llsin• insurance was filled out by the defendant's 
ngPnt four and one-half years prior to the collision. No 
<'Opy was given plaintiff nor was the representation dis-
cussed. It is true that under "Representations" there 
was printed ''I do not use alcoholic beverages and will 
not do so for the term of this policy." Defendant then 
(•arrfully investigated the plaintiff and then issued a pol-
w\· free and clear of any such representation. No men-
1 io11 was ever made of it until the plaintiff suffered a loss 
n t which time the defendants denied coverage. The law 
in this regard is clear that the courts are strongly against 
forfeitures of insurance coverage. See Murray v. Home 
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Benefit Ass'n, 9 California 402, 27 Pac. 309; Mitigrr Y. 
N cw York Life Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 2d 834, 112 Pac. 2d 621; 
Heber v. Life Ins. Co., 18 Calif. 2d 269, 63 Par. 2d 318. 
The courts further generally hold the forfeiture should 
be granted unless the warranty is set forth in the pofay 
in dear and unmistakable terms; Bittinger v. N eui York 
Life Insurana Company, 17 Calif. 2d 834, 112 Pac. 2d 
621. Courts are opposed to forfeitures of insurance pol-
icies on technical grounds. See Howell v. American 111-
surance, 114 Calif. 660, 84 Pac. 182. It is generally hrld 
that the courts are opposed to unreasonable forfeitmes 
and technical forfeitures on rules which are unrelatrd to 
the merits of the case. Olds v. General Accident and FirP 
Ins. Co., 67 Calif. 2d 842, 5 Pac. 2d 676. Attempts to can-
cel policies after the insured has suffered a loss is not tol-
erated or permitted in states where compulsory insura11cr 
is required. This rule is applied equally to the insured 
as well as the third party, Ohran v. National his. ('o., 82 
Calif. 2d 636, 187 Pac. 2d 66. 
Representations are not warranties and thesr arr 
written or oral statements made prior to the completion 
of the contract policy and usually gfre information to 
the insurer on the subject of insurance, and from these 
facts the insurance company determines whrtlwr or not 
it will issue the policy. Representations rarely qualify 
as an express provisions in the policy of insurance, hut 
in some instances it may qualify as an implied warranty 
where active fraud is present. In matters or opinion a 
representation is false only when it is intended to hr 
false. The fact that a representation is based on opinion 
or estimate distinguishes it from a warranty and suhse-
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q111•ut fad which different from the original opinion or 
('stirrwte does not necessarily render the representation 
1111trne. In matters of health or habits a representation 
of fra ml or of deceit are required in order to change the 
reprcsrntation to an implied warranty. These facts must 
h<> drawn from the circumstances and it is a question for 
tltr jury. vVhere there is no fraud or deceit rescission or 
forfeiture is not allowed. In this case the rlefendant claims 
no fraud or deceit but relies solely on breach of implied 
warra11t~'. The Courts are unanimous in holding not only 
that fraud and deceit are necessary elements, but the 
fraurl and deceit proved must be material to the cause. 
In instant case the defendant has maintained that intoxi-
ratio11 is immaterial, that any drinking of even a minutia. 
nature would void the policy, all of which is contra to the 
established law. See McClelland v. New York Life Ins. 
r'o., 2;) Calif. 694, 139 Pa~. 2d 242; Martin v. Mutual Bene-
fit Health and Accident Ins. Co., 71 Calif. 2d 557, 162 
Pac. 2d 980. 
CONCLUSION 
It is generally held that to render a representation 
a \\-'arranty there must be a misrepresentation of an 
existing fact, promises and opinions and estimates pro-
jcctC'd in the future are seldom if ever held to be an im-
plied warranty in that active fraud is never present under 
thcRe circumstances. Representations are matters of in-
dueC'ment merely, and usually relate to present existing 
facts or conditions and need only be substantially true 
and must relate to a material matter in order to qualify 
as an implied warranty. See Spence v. Central Accident 
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Insurance Co., 86 N.E. 104, 236 Ill. 44, 19 L.R.A. (N.~.) 
88. Ordinarily, a statement made on an application blank 
is a representation only and must me incorporated by 
rl'ference in the policy before it hecam<'s a warranty. IH 
the instant case this was never done. See North A 111eri"a 
Ins. Co. v. Rchacek, 123 Ill. App. 219. A good example of 
this problem often arises in cases of honesty bonds whrrP 
hank officials certify that their employees are hmwst 
and will remain so in the future as an inducC'ment to the 
issuance of the policy. This has g<'11erally heen hPld to hP 
a representation in that it is a11 opi11io11 and therrfo1P 
not a warranty. Sec (iut11rir National Hank"· Pirlelit.11 
Deposit and Guarmdec of Jfaryla.Jl(l, 87 Pac. 2d :100, H 
Okla. 636, also 17 Oklahoma 397, citing Ri('I' Y. Firll'iit.11 
and Deposit of Jf aryland, 103 Fed. 430 a11<l -1:3 ('ra :l/O. 
In every instant in order to Yoid policy the representatio11 
must he of a material nature. 
In view of the foregoing the con rt erred in voidi11~ 
the policy without evidence; in that the reprC'se11tati011 
was one of opinion trivial in nature aml not material to 
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